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Abstract This paper analyzes the social welfare effects of tax-benefit reforms in a
framework integrating endogenous labor supply and unemployment. We adopt an or-
dinal approach to social welfare comparisons by searching for “socially desirable”
reforms that would improve social welfare for an entire class of social welfare func-
tions. In the model, there is a discrete distribution of individuals’ productivities and
individuals are heterogeneous with respect to leisure preferences (or disability of
work). Labor supply decisions are limited to the participation decision. Unemploy-
ment is modeled in a search and matching framework with individual wage bargain-
ing. For the social welfare analysis, the model is calibrated for Switzerland. Starting
from a situation with an unemployment benefit scheme, the introduction of in-work
benefits is shown to be a “socially desirable” reform: it would be unanimously pre-
ferred to the current situation according to all social welfare functions based on the
criteria of Pareto, anonymity, and the principle of transfers. This result holds for two
different types of preference heterogeneity (leisure preferences or disability of work)
and also for the case where job search effort cannot be monitored.
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1 Introduction
The persistence of unemployment and the appearance of new types of poverty in
Europe has raised the awareness of the link between the tax system, unemployment
insurance, and social assistance. In this context, incentive problems—such as the pos-
sible existence of a poverty or unemployment trap—have become more prominent.
As governments face increasing difficulties to finance the social transfer system, the
introduction of tax credits or other reforms of the tax-benefit system are widely dis-
cussed, but their implementation meets with resistance in most continental European
countries.
The economic consequences of reform proposals have traditionally been analyzed
in a competitive labor market setting, focusing on labor supply response (see, e.g.,
Moffitt 2003; Fortin et al. 1993; Blundell et al. 2000). In this context, as in the optimal
taxation literature originated by Mirrlees (1971), redistribution implies necessarily a
trade-off between equity and efficiency. A more equitable distribution of income can
only be obtained at the expense of reduced aggregate output. The exclusive reliance
on labor supply response can, however, be misleading. An ill-conceived reform of the
tax-benefit system might have the unwanted side effect of increasing involuntary un-
employment. To avoid unwarranted conclusions, it is crucial to take labor market im-
perfections into account in the analysis of tax-benefit reforms. In such a framework,
more redistribution does not necessarily come at the expense of economic efficiency.
This paper analyzes the effects of tax-benefit reforms in a framework integrating
endogenous labor supply and unemployment. We use a search-matching model of la-
bor markets with endogenous participation and heterogeneity in two dimensions: in-
dividual productivity (skill) and preference for leisure. Combining theoretical consid-
erations and simulation analysis for the Swiss case, we address the question whether
there are reforms leading to outcomes that are socially preferred to the current situa-
tion where an unemployment insurance system is in place. To ensure comparability,
reforms are required to be neutral with respect to the government budget.
What criterion should be used to determine whether a reform is socially desirable?
As most reforms produce winners and losers, the Pareto criterion is of little use for
ranking pre- and post-reform situations. In order to overcome the incompleteness of
Pareto rankings, many economists resort to social welfare functions, which rely on
interpersonal comparisons of well-being. As the choice of a specific social welfare
function reflects an observer’s value judgments, its use in the evaluation of policy
reforms might be criticized for its subjectivity. This weakness can, however, be ad-
dressed by carrying out comparisons of pre- and post-reform income distributions for
an entire class of social welfare functions. By performing such ordinal comparisons
of income distributions, unanimous judgments on the desirability of a reform can be
obtained. This is the approach we follow in our paper.
We label a policy reform as socially desirable if the post-reform situation domi-
nates the current situation in terms of social welfare. This terminology is motivated
by the fact that all observers whose ethical preferences are characterized by a so-
cial welfare function of a given class would support such a reform. In our search
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for socially desirable policy reforms, we concentrate on second-order social welfare
dominance. That is, we are evaluating the desirability of a reform with respect to the
class of social welfare functions that embody some degree of inequality aversion.
Necessary conditions for a reform to be socially desirable are that economic effi-
ciency is improved and that the poorest individual’s utility does not deteriorate.1 The
latter condition excludes as possible reform candidates a simple reduction in unem-
ployment benefits. There is, however, scope for enhancing efficiency without worsen-
ing the situation of the least well-off. In models of involuntary unemployment, a more
progressive tax structure might reduce unemployment and improve overall economic
efficiency (Pissarides 1998; Sørensen 1999; Strand 2002).
These results are based on models where labor supply is exogenous and individual
heterogeneity is not taken into account. They are at odds with the optimal taxation
literature which focuses on skill heterogeneity and where greater equity comes at the
expense of efficiency. In order to build a bridge between these approaches, our frame-
work integrates endogenous labor supply decisions into a search-matching model of
unemployment, akin to Hungerbühler et al. (2006) and Lehmann et al. (2011). As in
recent models of optimal taxation, we assume that there is a discrete distribution of
individuals’ productivities (Saez 2002) and that individuals are heterogeneous with
respect to preferences for leisure (Beaudry et al. 2009) or disutility of labor (Choné
and Laroque 2005, 2011). In our model, labor supply decisions consist in deciding
whether to participate or not; individuals cannot choose the number of hours they
would like to work. This simplifying assumption is motivated by the fact that elas-
ticities of hours of work conditional on participating are found to be small in most
empirical studies (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).
Unemployment is modeled in a search and matching framework with individual
wage bargaining, following Pissarides (2000). We assume that different skill levels
are perfect substitutes in production. To allow a consistent evaluation of welfare ef-
fects, transitions toward the steady state are explicitly taken into account and social
welfare evaluations are based on individuals’ intertemporal utilities. To the extent that
the impact of policy changes on social welfare has an ambiguous sign, we calibrate
the model using data for Switzerland.
In our model, the government is able to observe an individual’s skill if he is work-
ing, but not otherwise. Individual preferences are private information. We assume
furthermore that the government does not know what type of preference heterogene-
ity underlies the observed participation behavior. Following Cuff (2000), we consider
two versions of preference heterogeneity (taste for leisure or work disability), which
have identical behavioral implications but yield different cardinal utilities, with im-
portant implications for interpersonal comparisons by the government.
The decision to search for a job is a binary decision in our model. We do not
model explicitly the imperfect monitoring of search effort (see Van der Linden 2004),
but we take this issue into account by considering two polar cases: one where job
1These necessary conditions are derived from two special cases of this class of social welfare functions
(SWF): the utilitarian SWF and the Rawlsian SWF. Note also that second-order social welfare dominance
does not exclude the case where a reform produces winners and losers as long as the former are on average
poorer than the latter.
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search behavior is perfectly observed and another where it cannot be observed at all.
A socially desirable reform policy must improve social welfare in both cases.
In our search for social-welfare-improving reform policies, we look for possible
reform candidates in two steps. First, we explore the conditions that would ensure
efficient policies, allowing for nonlinear taxation. We show that, with unemployment
benefits in place, the government can implement an efficient policy only if job search
can be perfectly monitored. Such a policy would require to implement in-work ben-
efits and a marginal tax schedule that decreases with skill. Second, we explore the
social welfare effects of tax-benefit reform, considering an entire class of social wel-
fare functions and limiting our analysis to linear tax-benefit schemes.
The introduction of in-work benefits turns out to be a socially desirable reform,
with unemployment benefits maintained at the current level. We confirm this result
by using an ordinal approach: the post-reform distribution second-order dominates
the pre-reform distribution for all versions of our model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
relation between our paper and the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the model.
Section 4 presents the ordinal approach to policy reform and explores potential reform
policies. Section 5 concludes.
2 Relation to the literature
The approach chosen in our paper is related to the literature on tax reform in the
late seventies when Feldstein (1976) argued that it is more realistic to consider small
changes from the status quo (tax reform) rather than an optimal “de novo” tax de-
sign (optimal taxation). According to Feldstein, tax reform is piecemeal and dynamic
and its analysis must take the existing tax system as a starting point. In more formal
contributions, Guesnerie (1977) and Weymark (1981) analyze the conditions under
which a small change from the existing tax system leads to a Pareto improvement.
Our approach is in the spirit of Feldstein but differs from Guesnerie’s and Weymark’s
perspective mainly because we use a different criterion for evaluating the reform:
Generalized Lorenz dominance (or second-order stochastic dominance). The reforms
that we consider fulfill the conditions of second-order stochastic dominance but gen-
erally do not lead to first-order stochastic dominance of the post-reform over the
pre-reform utility distribution. These reforms are not Pareto-improving because high-
skill workers lose with the introduction of an in-work benefit that is accompanied by
higher marginal tax rates, and overall a more progressive tax system.
There are obvious links between our paper and the vast literature on optimal tax-
ation although our paper asks a different question. The optimal taxation approach
describes the optimal tax-benefit scheme for a given social welfare function whereas
we are searching for reforms that might improve social welfare compared to the cur-
rent (nonoptimal) situation, for an entire class of social welfare functions. The latter
(ordinal) approach imposes much more stringent conditions on the choice of desirable
reform policies than the use of a single social welfare function would imply.2
2If the desirability of reforms were evaluated using a single social welfare function, a loss in efficiency
could always be traded off against a reduction in inequality and a decrease in the poorest individual’s
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One strand of the optimal taxation literature focuses on labor supply models with-
out search frictions. Our paper is related in particular with contributions that con-
centrate on the extensive margin of labor supply. Our way of modeling labor supply
decisions is similar to Diamond (1980) and the “extensive responses” model in Saez
(2002) where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity and
utility from leisure (or disutility from work) and the skills of workers are observable
because individuals can only work full-time in a job that corresponds to their skill.
As Saez (2002, p. 1050) shows, social welfare generally increases if one moves from
a negative income tax (NIT) toward an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) schedule.
However, this result does not hold if the social welfare function (SWF) is utilitarian
or of the Rawlsian type. Therefore, the extensive model of labor supply seems to fa-
vor the introduction of in-work benefits, but not under all SWF that are part of the
class that we consider.3 In our model, the introduction of in-work benefits tends to
be more favorable than in these contributions because of the moderating influence of
these benefits (and the higher marginal tax rate that accompanies them) on the wage
bargaining process.
We take also account of the important insight by Cuff (2000) that the type of pref-
erence heterogeneity matters for the definition of cardinal utilities (and social wel-
fare) even if observable behavior is the same. For example, if participation decisions
are determined by heterogeneous preferences for leisure, the inactive are generally
better off than similarly skilled individuals who participate in the labor market. On
the other hand, if there is heterogeneity in disutility from participating in the labor
market, working individuals are generally better off than the inactive.4
More recently, search frictions and unemployment have been taken into account in
the analysis of optimal taxation. Our paper is related to Boone and Bovenberg (2002,
2004), Hungerbühler et al. (2006), and Lehmann et al. (2011) who take account of
the existence of involuntary unemployment in their analysis of optimal taxation. In
contrast to these contributions, our analysis relies on a dynamic version of the Pis-
sarides (2000) model whereas Hungerbühler et al. (2006) and Lehmann et al. (2011)
use a static version of this model and Boone and Bovenberg (2004) formulate a static
model of search unemployment with linear search costs. The dynamic framework is
important in our context since we want to account for the transition from the pre-
reform to the post-reform situation. The transition path is crucial for a consistent
evaluation of changes in individual welfare.
Boone and Bovenberg (2004) and Hungerbühler et al. (2006) rely on a formulation
of labor supply where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity
or skill. We assume not only heterogeneity in productivity but also with respect to the
preference for leisure, similar to Lehmann et al. (2011). Interestingly, these authors
welfare could always be traded off against an increase in the welfare of other individuals. Our main result—
that the introduction of in-work benefits leads to a situation which dominates the current situation in terms
of social welfare—cannot be inferred from the description of optimal tax schedules.
3In a model with discrete participation decisions and a continuous effort level, Choné and Laroque (2011)
show that financial incentives to work for low-skill individuals are part of the optimal tax schedule when
participation costs are pecuniary. See also Beaudry et al. (2009) for a similar contribution in a different
setup (discrete productivities).
4See also Choné and Laroque (2010) for a rigorous analysis of this question in the Mirrlees model.
Social welfare effects of tax-benefit reform 203
find that the optimal tax schedule includes an EITC-type in-work benefit if the social
welfare function is close to the utilitarian case, but resembles a NIT if the SWF is of
the Rawlsian type.
Finally, there are a few other contributions in the literature that analyze the effects
of tax-benefit reforms in a labor market with frictions. Our paper differs from these
contributions by carrying out an ordinal welfare analysis, on the one hand, and by
combining an endogenous participation decision with heterogeneous skills and un-
employment. In our view, all these elements are crucial for the analysis of tax-benefit
reform; other contributions have considered only a subset. For example, Van der Lin-
den (2002) analyzes the introduction of a basic income in a framework with union
bargaining, risk-averse workers and exogenous labor supply; Van der Linden (2004)
endogenizes the participation decision, but does not capture skill heterogeneity and
neglects the dynamic adjustment path.5
3 The model
As we want to sort out the implications of possible reform policies, it is important to
give an accurate definition of the pre-reform situation, on the one hand, and to define
clearly the policy instruments that are available for reform, on the other hand. We
try to capture the current situation in Switzerland (and other continental European
countries) by assuming that the existing tax-benefit system is characterized by the
existence of an unemployment insurance scheme, but that no help is provided by the
government to individuals who are not actively seeking for work. Unemployment
benefits are financed by a tax on labor earnings. By contrast to the situation in the
US and the UK, no Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) or Working Tax Credit (WTC)
exists in the initial situation.
As to policy instruments, we assume that the government’s action is constrained
by the impossibility to observe an individual’s preference for leisure (or disutility
of work). Moreover, an individual’s skill cannot be observed if he is not working.
Therefore, the government is unable to differentiate benefits paid to those who do not
hold a job. By contrast, an individual’s skill can be observed if he is working: this
is ensured by the assumption that individuals can only work full-time in a job that
matches their skill.
The payment of unemployment benefits gives rise to a moral hazard problem if
individuals outside the labor force do not receive any benefits. As the government is
unable to determine an unemployed’s type, it does not know whether an individual
has a real incentive to search for work (job search is a binary decision in our model).6
Therefore, it makes sense for the government to monitor search effort of unemployed
individuals. We do not model imperfect monitoring explicitly7 but we take this is-
5See also Lehmann (2003) who analyzes the introduction of a basic income in a search-matching model
with two skill categories and exogenous labor supply.
6In a first-best world where it observes individuals’ types (skill and preference parameters), an inequality-
averse government would choose a policy that would equalize utility levels of all individuals (Choné and
Laroque 2005). Those who have a strong taste for leisure would be taxed whereas the government would
pay an unemployment benefit only to those whose preference for leisure is below a certain threshold.
7Calibration of monitoring parameters would be somehow arbitrary.
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sue into account by considering two polar cases: one where job search behavior is
perfectly observed and another where it cannot be observed.
Reform policies are further constrained by the government’s ignorance about the
type of preference heterogeneity that underlies the observed participation behavior.
We consider two types of heterogeneity (heterogeneous preferences for leisure or
heterogeneous disutility of work) that give rise to the same observed labor market
behavior. As the government is unable to determine the type of heterogeneity that
governs economic behavior, a socially desirable reform policy must improve social
welfare in both types of models.
The policy instruments at the disposal of the government are the following benefits
and taxes that depend on the labor market status of the individual.8 For individuals
who are not working, we denote unemployment benefits by zu and benefits paid to
individuals outside the labor force by zn. We distinguish two polar cases: (i) if perfect
monitoring of job search is possible, the two can be fixed independently and (ii) if
search monitoring is impossible, the two must be equal (zn = zu). As the government
is able to observe the skill i of individuals who are working, in-work benefits can
be differentiated by skill and are denoted by zwi . Marginal tax rates on (net) wage
income can also be differentiated by skill and are denoted by τi . Note that all these
instruments are linked by the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.9
3.1 Employment, unemployment, and participation
We assume that there is a finite number of skill levels and that productivity pi of a
worker with skill level i can be perfectly observed by firms. Each firm employs one
worker and produces an identical homogeneous good whose price is the numéraire.10
In this setup, labor markets for different skill levels would operate independently from
each other if there was no government intervention; redistributive policies constitute
the only link between these markets.
The labor market for each skill level is modeled following a standard search-
matching framework (Pissarides 2000). Individuals are assumed to be risk neutral.
Let ui denote the unemployment rate and vi vacant jobs as a fraction of the labor
force with skill level i. The process by which job vacancies and unemployed workers
are matched is represented by a matching function M(ui, vi), which is assumed in-
creasing in both arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. For simplicity, M
is identical for all skill levels. The probability of matching a vacant job to an unem-
ployed worker per unit time is given by M(ui, vi)/vi = M(ui/vi,1) = M(1/θi,1) =
m(θi) where θi = vi/ui measures tightness of the labor market for skill level i.
8Because of the absence of capital in the model, we adopt the conservative assumption that there is no tax
on firm profits. The entrepreneurs’ income could be taxed away without creating distortions in our model,
but such an outcome would be unrealistic. Indeed, in a more complete model with capital accumulation,
a tax on profits would have detrimental effects on growth.
9In our simulations of Sects. 4.2 and 4.3, we assume that the marginal tax rate is unique and independent
of skill. For given benefits, the marginal tax rate on labor income is then determined by the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint.
10This assumption is analogous to the hypothesis, which is standard in the literature of optimal taxation,
that different labor types are perfectly substitutable.
Social welfare effects of tax-benefit reform 205
As the dynamic analysis will show, it is easier to express the model in terms of the
employment rate (the share of employed individuals in total population), i , rather
than the unemployment rate. The two are related by i = (1−ui)πi , where πi denotes
the participation rate. The employment rate i evolves according to
˙i = θim(θi)(πi − i) − qi. (1)
The first term on the right-hand side denotes the transition of the unemployed,
(πi − i ), toward employment, where θim(θi) is the probability per unit time that an
unemployed finds a job. The second term represents those who are leaving employ-
ment because their job is destroyed (q is the exogenous probability of job destruction
per unit time, identical for all i).
Consider now the present discounted value of expected profits from a vacant job,
Vi , and from an occupied job, Ji . The Bellman equation for Vi is
rVi = −pic + m(θi)(Ji − Vi) + V˙i , (2)
where c is the cost of maintaining a job vacant. The zero-profit condition implies that
Vi = V˙i = 0 such that
Ji = pic/m(θi) (3)
holds at any moment in time. Moreover, Ji evolves according to
rJi = pi − wi(1 + τi) − q(Ji − Vi) + J˙i , (4)
where wi is the wage (net of tax).
The present discounted value of an unemployed worker’s expected future income,
Ui , evolves according to
rUi = zu + θim(θi)(Wi − Ui) + U˙i , (5)
whereas for employed workers the corresponding value is Wi and follows
rWi = wi + zwi + q(Ui − Wi) + W˙i . (6)
After a vacant job has been occupied by an unemployed worker, the wage is de-
termined by bilateral wage bargaining. Thus, the wage is obtained as the solution to
the generalized Nash maximand
max
wi
(Wi − Ui)β(Ji − Vi)1−β, (7)
where β represents the worker’s relative bargaining power. Assuming that wages are
continually renegotiated implies that the necessary condition
β(Ji − Vi) = (1 − β)(1 + τi)(Wi − Ui) (8)
holds not only in levels and but also in rates of change. After some manipulation (see,
e.g., Pissarides 2000), the following wage equation is obtained:
wi = (1 − β)(zu − zwi) + βpi1 + τi (1 + θic). (9)
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Net wages are a weighted average of the worker’s fallback position and the net output
that the worker produces on his job (including the saving of hiring costs enjoyed by
the firm). The latter term depends on the worker’s skill level pi and on his bargaining
power: the higher his bargaining power, the greater his share of net output.
We model the participation decision in two different ways, which differ in the man-
ner individual heterogeneity is taken into account. Here, we present a first version of
the model (with heterogeneity in preferences for leisure) and defer the description of
the other version to the next subsection. Individuals who stay outside the labor force
receive a real return from leisure of x per unit of time, in addition to any monetary
transfer paid by the government. The present discounted value of such an individual’s
utility (measured in real monetary units), N(x), is therefore given by
rN(x) = x + zn. (10)
Individuals of a given skill level are all equally productive on their jobs, but hetero-
geneous with respect to their preference for leisure. This heterogeneity is described
by a distribution function H(x), which is common to all skill levels. Individuals for
whom N(x) < Ui choose to work. The reservation level ξi of the leisure parameter x
(i.e. the value at which an individual of skill i is indifferent between leisure and work)
is determined implicitly by the arbitrage condition N(ξi) = Ui and is therefore equal
to
ξi = (r + q)(zu − zn) + θim(θi)(w + zwi − zn)
r + q + θim(θi) . (11)
Finally, the fraction of the population who choose to work (or to look for work) is
equal to πi = H(ξi).
The government’s budget constraint constitutes the only link between labor market
segments (corresponding to skill levels). We require that the intertemporal budget
constraint be satisfied across segments, but the budget does not have to be balanced
in each period. We assume that the marginal tax rates τi are constant over time. Their
levels are set such as to balance the intertemporal budget constraint.
It useful to break down the government’s net borrowing by labor market segment
b˙i = rbi + (πi − i)zu + izwi + (1 − πi)zn − iτiwi, (12)
where bi is per capita borrowing by the government related to skill level i. Integrating
equation (12) and imposing the no-Ponzi condition yields
bi(0) =
∫ ∞
0
[
iτiwi − (πi − i)zu − izwi − (1 − πi)zn
]
e−rt dt. (13)
This equation makes clear that bi(0) is the present value of future net contributions
of skill i to the government budget. The initial values of bi indicate the degree of
redistribution among skill levels. A positive (negative) value of bi(0) indicates that
individuals of skill i are net tax payers (net tax beneficiaries) in present value terms.
The initial stock of total government borrowing is set to zero. Therefore, the gov-
ernment’s intertemporal budget constraint can be written as
b(0) =
∑
i
sibi(0) = 0, (14)
where si is the share of workers with skill i.
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We assume that the levels of per capita transfers (zu, zwi and zn) and the tax rate on
labor income (τi ) are constant over time. The government chooses the levels of these
variables such as to balance the intertemporal budget constraint (14), anticipating
thereby the future evolution of the economy.
The dynamics of the model can now be made explicit. Substituting Eq. (9) into
(4) establishes, together with (3), that both Ji and θi are constant over time, i.e., they
jump instantaneously to their equilibrium value. The same is true for the variables Ui
and Wi , since differential equations (5) and (6) are unstable.11 The only variable that
does not adjust immediately to its steady-state level is the employment rate (because
of the forward-looking behavior of the government, all fiscal variables are assumed
to be constant over time).
The equilibrium of the model can thus be summarized as follows. Consider first
the determination of labor market tightness and the wage rate. Combining Eqs. (3)
and (4) yields the “job creation” condition:
wi = pi1 + τi
[
1 − c(r + q)
m(θi)
]
. (15)
For each skill level, the wage curve (9) and the job creation condition (15) determine
jointly the equilibrium level of θi , for a given tax rate τi , as follows:
(1 − β)[pi − (1 + τi)(zu − zwi)] = [r + q + βθim(θi)]pic/m(θi). (16)
As τi is determined using the intertemporal budget constraint of the government
(14), each θi depends in general on the levels of participation rates and on the path of
the employment rates in all labor market segments. There is, however, one particular
set of policies which breaks the interdependence between the levels of labor market
tightness in the different labor market segments. Indeed, it is obvious from (16) that
the tax rate has no incidence on the determination of θi if the condition zu = zwi is
satisfied. Equation (16) allows even a stronger conclusion: any policy reform, which
satisfies the condition zu = zwi leaves labor market tightness unchanged for all skill
levels.
Turn now to the determination of the rates of participation, employment, and un-
employment. It should be emphasized that, on the one hand, the unemployment rate
does not adjust immediately to its long-run level and, on the other hand, the initial
unemployment rate is not fixed. Indeed, as Eq. (11) reveals, the participation rate π
jumps immediately to its equilibrium value after a shock. As a consequence, indi-
viduals who choose to participate must queue for jobs, increasing thereby the initial
unemployment rate.12 This argument makes clear that in the model with endogenous
11Note that, because of wage bargaining, the difference Wi −Ui depends only on θi . Indeed, Eqs. (3) and
(8) imply
Wi − Ui =
(
β
1 − β
)
pic
(1 + τi )m(θi ) .
12Alternatively, if a shock decreases the participation rate, some of the unemployed will quit the queue,
thereby decreasing the unemployment rate.
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participation, the “sticky” variable is not the unemployment rate, but the employment
rate, i .
The evaluation of policy reforms carried out below rely on social welfare functions
that are built on the assumption that interpersonal comparisons of utility levels are
possible. It is therefore important to define individual utility levels in a consistent way.
This can be ensured by measuring utility levels in a money metric and by choosing
the initial utility level (at time t = 0) as the pertinent indicator for the assessment of
policy reforms. Indeed, the initial utility level can be interpreted as the “asset value”
of being in a certain state (employment, unemployment, etc.) and summarizes the
present value of expected future income. This is why we use the dynamic formulation
of the model in our analysis; the steady-state equations would not allow to obtain
correct measures of individual utilities.
When using social welfare measures which are sensitive to distributional consider-
ations, the structure of firm ownership matters. To keep things transparent, we assume
that there is a homogeneous group of entrepreneurs whose only income stems from
entrepreneurial activity, i.e. profits from occupied jobs. It would not be realistic to
assume that each entrepreneur owns exactly one firm (they would be the poorest pop-
ulation group); we assume instead that all entrepreneurs share equally the ownership
of all firms.
3.2 Preference heterogeneity: alternative interpretations
In the model outlined above, an individual outside the labor force receives a real
return to leisure of x (and a transfer zn). In this version of the model, those who have
a strong taste for leisure decide to stay outside the labor force. From the point of view
of the government who measures individual utilities in cardinal terms, these inactive
individuals are better off than the unemployed of the same skill.13 Due to their high
utility level, inactive individuals receive a smaller weight in a social welfare function
that embodies a preference for equality. In this context, the government interprets a
strong taste for leisure as a form of “laziness” on the part of those individuals (Cuff
2000).
Following Cuff’s (2000) original idea, the model can be reformulated in a way
that yields an identical outcome in terms of all observable variables but a different
set of individual cardinal utilities. In this alternative version of the model, we as-
sume that the real return to leisure is identical for all individuals (ν), but that there is
heterogeneity in disutility from participating in the labor market.14
As above, the heterogeneity parameter is denoted by x and is distributed according
to the distribution function H(x). The newly defined utility levels are denoted by a
13Most inactive individuals are also better off than most of the working individuals of the same skill. In
the model, the utility of being employed is higher than the utility of being unemployed, but this difference
is rather small due to the fast turnover in the labor market.
14The equivalence between the two versions of the model holds only if individuals experience the same
level of disutility from being employed and from being unemployed. This assumption might seem strong,
but can be justified by the fact that it is not necessarily easier for a disabled person to actively seek for
work than to be employed.
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tilde and are related to the original utility levels as follows:
U˜i(x) = Ui + (ν − x)/r, (17)
W˜i(x) = Wi + (ν − x)/r, (18)
N˜ = N(x) + (ν − x)/r = (ν + zn)/r. (19)
An individual characterized by skill i and work disutility x decides to participate
in the labor market if his work disutility is smaller than a critical level ξi , which is
defined by U˜i(ξi) = N˜ . It is straightforward to show that this reparameterization of
the model leads to identical outcomes in all observable variables. The intuitive reason
for this result is that what matters for individuals who participate in the labor market
is the difference between their utility levels when employed and when unemployed;
this difference is the same in both versions of the model.
However, the distribution of cardinal utilities is different from the original version
of the model. Here, individuals outside the labor force are less well-off than those
who are in the labor force. Therefore, the weights of inactive individuals in the social
welfare function are greater than the weights of those who are in the labor force. The
government sees the former as the neediest since they have the greatest disability
for work. This interpretation of the parameter x as a form of disability has therefore
very different implications for social welfare compared to the original version of the
model where x can be interpreted as a form of laziness.
In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to the original version of the model
as L-model (or L-heterogeneity) where L stands for leisure or laziness. The modi-
fied model will be referred to as D-model (or D-heterogeneity) where D stands for
disutility from work or disability.
3.3 Calibration of the model
When evaluating the social welfare consequences of different reform programs, it
is not always possible to get clear-cut qualitative results. Nevertheless, quantitative
conclusions can be drawn by calibrating the model and by simulating various reform
policies in our dynamic framework. The parameters of the model are chosen in such
a way that the long-run equilibrium of the model replicates the main labor market
indicators of the Swiss economy in 1998 (see Tables 1 and 2).15 The model is cali-
brated in two steps. First, we calibrate an aggregate version of the model using the
information contained in Table 1. Second, we calibrate productivities (differentiated
by skill) that are consistent with the observed wage structure.
The matching technology is specified as a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb–
Douglas function: m(θ) = m0θ−η . As a consequence, the matching elastiticy, η, is
constant. In their survey of the matching function, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
report that most empirical studies do not reject the assumption of constant returns to
scale and that most estimates of η lie in the range [0.5–0.7]. As most authors of sim-
ulation studies, we choose the symmetric specification with η = 0.5. Together with
15There have been very small changes in unemployment rates and the structure of wages between 1998
and 2008 in Switzerland, by contrast to other European countries.
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Table 1 Calibration of the model: aggregate indicators
Parameter or variable (base values)a
Unemployment rate u 0.039
Participation rate π 0.83
Semi-elasticity of participation 0.20
Labor market tightness θ 0.239
Replacement rate zu/w 0.40
Job destruction rateb q 0.077
Real interest rateb r 0.03
Workers’ bargaining power β 0.5
Matching function (elasticity) η 0.5
Cost of vacant jobc c 2.3
Matching function (scale parameter)c m0 0.31
Initial tax ratec,d τ 0.0162
aData sources: unemployment (OFS 2001a, p.152), participation (OFS 2001b, tableau 1a*; reference pop-
ulation: 15 years—retirement), vacancies (OFS 2000, p. 34), job destruction (anual mean from Flückiger
and Vassiliev 2002)
bAnnual basis
cCalibrated using the equations of the model
dThis value corresponds to the model with perfect monitoring of search behavior (zn = 0). If monitoring
is impossible (zn = zu), τ is equal to 0.101
Table 2 Calibration of the model: structural indicators
Skill level Share in
populationa
Wage
indexa
Participation
rateb
Semi-elasticity of
participationb
Search monitoringc yes no yes no
University 0.055 1.000 0.929 0.955 0.107 0.074
Superior education 0.225 0.695 0.882 0.905 0.157 0.133
Apprenticeship 0.460 0.535 0.836 0.840 0.195 0.192
Basic skills 0.260 0.404 0.776 0.721 0.236 0.265
aEstimates from the Swiss wage structure survey 1998 (OFS 1999)
bCalibrated using the equations of the model
cIndicates whether it is assumed for calibration that search can be perfectly monitored (yes, zn = 0) or that
search is impossible to monitor (no, zn = zu)
the assumption of symmetric bargaining (β = 0.5), this ensures that the decentralized
equilibrium is efficient.
The model is calibrated for four skill categories, which we take to represent dif-
ferent education levels. Wage differentials (reported in Table 2) between skill levels
are estimated on the basis of a modified Mincerian wage equation, using dummy
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variables for the four skill levels instead of a unique variable measuring years of
schooling. These estimations (as well as the proportions of the different skill groups
in population) are obtained from the Swiss Wage Structure Survey 1998. Note that in
this survey, employers report required skill levels for each job; this indicator is linked
more closely to productivity than the worker’s actual education level. Productivity
parameters pi are then calibrated such as to reproduce the structure of wages. The
marginal tax rate is assumed identical for all skill levels (see Sect. 4.2).
Turn now to the participation decision. The shape of the distribution function H(·)
determines both the rate and the elasticity of participation, for all skill levels. The par-
ticipation elasticities estimated for Switzerland are rather low on average (Gerfin and
Leu 2007; Abul Naga et al. 2008)16 and these elasticities tend to decrease with the
level of skill (Immervoll et al. 2007; Meghir and Phillips 2008). The lognormal dis-
tribution function reproduces these features quite well. Define the semi-elasticity of
participation as Ei = (dπi/dξi)ξi . Then the lognormal distribution has the following
properties:
πi = Φ
(
log(ξi) − μ
σ
)
, Ei = 1
σ
φ
(
log(ξi) − μ
σ
)
, (20)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function and φ(·) the density func-
tion of the standard normal distribution. Given the average rate and elasticity of par-
ticipation (see Table 1), Eqs. (20) allow to calibrate the parameters μ and σ of the
lognormal distribution. When the model is calibrated for different productivity levels,
as described above, participation rates and semi-elasticities differ by skill level (see
Table 2).
The calibration differs also between the model versions where we assume perfect
monitoring of job search behavior (the model is calibrated assuming zn = 0) and the
versions where monitoring is assumed impossible (the model is calibrated assuming
zn = zu). The main difference is that the calibrated tax rate differs in the two cases
and therefore the structure of initial participation rates and of semi-elasticities of
participation differs slightly (see Table 2). Finally, in the D-model the real return to
leisure ν is set to the mean of the lognormal distribution of x (ν = exp(μ + σ 2/2)).
With this choice, the sum of individual utilities (utilitarian social welfare criterion) is
the same in both versions of the model.
4 An ordinal approach to policy reforms
When evaluating the desirability of an economic reform, we follow the ordinal ap-
proach to social welfare: a reform is considered socially desirable if it improves social
welfare for an entire class of social welfare functions (SWF). This approach allows
to identify reforms that could be agreed upon by observers with different value judg-
ments as long as these satisfy some widely accepted criteria. In this section, we first
16For example, Gerfin and Leu (2007) report for Switzerland participation elasticities of 0.36 for married
women and 0 for single women, single men, and men in couples.
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aim at identifying potential reform candidates by applying necessary conditions for a
reform to be socially desirable. In a second step, we apply the criterion of generalized
Lorenz dominance in order to check whether these potential reform policies satisfy
also sufficient conditions for social desirability.
We consider the class of SWF satisfying the criterion of anonymity, the Pareto cri-
terion and the principle of transfers.17 Due to the latter principle, the SWF belonging
to this class embody some degree of inequality aversion. The two polar cases of this
class of SWF are the utilitarian SWF (given by the sum of individual utilities) and the
Rawlsian SWF (equal to the utility of the poorest individual).
The Rawlsian and utilitarian special cases will guide us in this search since they
provide necessary conditions for a reform to be socially desirable. These necessary
conditions are (i) that economic efficiency (utilitarian social welfare or the sum of
individual utilities) is improved by the reform and (ii) that the “poorest” individual’s
utility does not deteriorate.
Note that the impact of a reform on economic efficiency is identical in the L-model
and the D-model. By contrast, the identity of the poorest individual (in utility terms)
differs: in the L-model, the individual with the lowest utility level is an unemployed
worker of the lowest skill, whereas in the D-model, the least well-off are the inactive.
4.1 Economic efficiency
Improving economic efficiency is a necessary condition for a reform to dominate
the pre-reform situation in terms of social welfare. In order to get some intuition
on the properties of our model, we first characterize optimal policies in terms of a
utilitarian social welfare criterion (which does not depend on the type of preference
heterogeneity assumed in the model).
This analysis of economic efficiency differs from the optimal taxation approach
in two respects. First, individual utility is linear in income in our model because of
the assumption of risk neutrality. Therefore, distributional issues are not taken into
account (they will become important below when we consider other SWFs). Second,
we focus only on redistributional and labor market policies, assuming that no general
expenditures or public goods have to be financed by taxes. One of the questions that
we ask in this section is whether it is possible to design a tax-benefit scheme (with
positive unemployment benefits) that achieves optimal economic efficiency.
As is detailed in Appendix A, maximizing a utilitarian social welfare criterion
(the sum of individual utilities) subject to a balanced government budget yields two
optimality conditions. The first condition defines optimal labor market tightness, the
second optimal labor market participation. The first condition does not depend on the
participation rate and can be expressed in terms of the policy instruments zwi and zu
(see Appendix A):
η(θi) − β
β
= (1 − β)(zu − zwi)
wi − (1 − β)(zu − zwi) . (21)
17The anonymity criterion is equivalent to symmetry of the SWF with respect to individual utilities. The
Pareto criterion states that the SWF is weakly increasing in individual utilities. The transfer principle states
that a mean-preserving equalizing transfer does not decrease social welfare. This is equivalent to saying
that the SWF is S-concave (Note that S-concavity implies symmetry).
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It is obvious from condition (21) that an efficient level of labor market tightness
can be achieved for all skill levels if (i) the Hosios (1990) condition η(θi) = β is
satisfied for all i and if (ii) the government chooses zwi = zu. It is well known that if
condition (i) is satisfied, search externalities are internalized and the resulting equilib-
rium is efficient (Hosios 1990; Pissarides 2000). As we do not focus on the correction
of externalities in our simulations, we assume that condition (i) is satisfied.18
Intuitively, condition (21) can be interpreted as follows. The existence of an un-
employment benefit improves the worker’s fallback position and enables him to ne-
gotiate a higher wage. As a result, there is less job creation, job market tightness
decreases and unemployment increases relative to a laissez-faire situation. The intro-
duction of an in-work benefit counteracts this mechanism: it makes the job more at-
tractive relative to unemployment and, therefore, the worker settles for a lower wage
in the bargaining process. If the in-work benefit is fixed at the same level than the
unemployment benefit, the two offset each other exactly in the bargaining process
and labor market tightness reaches the same level as in the case without government
intervention.
Note that if the Hosios condition is not satisfied, condition (21) shows how to
correct the labor market externality. For example, if the workers’ relative bargaining
power is smaller than the efficient level (β < η), the government should improve the
fallback position of workers by providing higher unemployment benefits than in-work
benefits. Boone and Bovenberg (2002) discuss this issue in more detail. They express
the interpretation of (21) in terms of marginal and average tax rates.19 If β < η, the
average employment tax rate (which has an impact on the size of the total surplus
of the match) should be increased relative to the marginal tax rate (which affects the
worker’s effective bargaining power through his share of the surplus). This can be
achieved, for example, by increasing unemployment benefits.
Consider now the optimal choice of labor market participation. Substituting the
optimal participation condition into the government’s net borrowing, Eq. (12) yields
the condition (see Appendix A):
zn = ri(0)
ri(0) + θim(θi) zu −
θim(θi)
ri(0) + θim(θi) rbi(0). (22)
To interpret this condition, we have to distinguish the two polar cases regarding
the possibility of job search monitoring. Consider first the case of perfect monitoring
where zu and zn can be differentiated. Combining (22) with the government’s budget
constraint (14) yields the following condition:
zn =
∑
i siλi∑
i si(λi + 1)
zu, λi = ri(0)
θim(θi)
. (23)
18This choice is sometimes justified by the fact that other search models lead to an equilibrium outcome
where the Hosios condition is satisfied. See Moene (1997) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). In our
simulations, we use a Cobb–Douglas matching function for which η(θi ) is constant and identical for all
skill levels.
19The difference in net tax payments between employment and unemployment is Ti = τiwi − zwi − zu.
Define the average “employment tax rate” as τe
i
= Ti/wi . Assuming that η is constant, condition (21) can
then be rewritten as τ¯ e
i
− τi = (η − β)/[η(1 − β)].
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The optimal marginal tax rates can be obtained by using Eqs. (12) and (22) yielding
τi = λi + πi
wi
∫ ∞
0 ri(t)e
−rt dt
(zu − zn). (24)
The main result in the case with perfect search monitoring is that an optimal eco-
nomic efficiency can be attained for any level of unemployment benefit if conditions
(21), (23), and (24) are satisfied. These conditions define the set of efficient redis-
tribution policies if perfect search monitoring is possible. To understand the eco-
nomic intuition behind these conditions, it is useful to define the marginal and aver-
age tax rates in our model. For skill i, the marginal tax rate on gross wage income is
τ ∗i = τi/(1+τi) and the average tax rate is τ¯i∗ = τ ∗i −zwi/w∗i , where w∗i = (1+τi)wi
is the gross (before-tax) wage.
If the Hosios condition is satisfied, in-work benefits zwi paid to all skill levels
have to be identical to the unemployment benefit, zu. People outside the labor force
receive a benefit zn which is proportional to zu. Note that when Eq. (23) is evaluated
using realistic parameter values, the optimal zn turns out to be close to zero (between
1 % and 2 % of the value of zu). The optimal marginal tax rates are decreasing
with skill according to (24) as they are (approximately) inversely proportional to the
corresponding wage rates. They are set such as to ensure that average tax rates are
approximately constant (and close to zero for our parameter values) for all skill levels.
As a result, the marginal tax schedule is slightly higher than (but very close to) the
simple tax schedule defined by τi = zu/wi .
How can these results be interpreted? For any level of unemployment benefits,
zu, the optimal labor market tightness is obtained if in-work benefits are set at the
same level, regardless of the marginal tax rates. Therefore, the marginal tax rates
τi are set such as to produce no distortion on the extensive margin of labor supply
(participation decision). As the participation decision depends on the average tax rate
and on transfers to the inactive zn, these policy instruments should be set such as to
offset the (small) incentive to participate that is created by the unemployment benefit.
In practical terms, this outcome is achieved with a small positive zn and average tax
rates that are approximately constant and close to zero.20
Now turn to the case where job search monitoring is assumed impossible. Then
we have zu = zn and condition (22) simplifies to zu = −rbi(0). Combining this re-
sult with the government’s budget constraint yields the unambiguous result that the
only efficient policy is laissez-faire where all benefits and taxes are set to zero. There-
fore, the optimal situation cannot be obtained with positive unemployment benefits in
20To understand this point, it should be emphasized that any increase in zwi is neutral with respect to the
participation decision of skill i if it is offset by a budget-neutral increase in the tax rate τi : both changes
apply to the same employment state and their incentive effects on participation cancel out because the
average tax rate remains unchanged. The same cannot be said of unemployment assistance: zu is received
when an individual is unemployed, but the corresponding tax is paid when the individual is working. An
individual who is out of the labor force and begins to search for a job will first be unemployed before being
able to find a job. Hence, the increase in unemployment benefits will be of more value for him than the fall
in the net wage due to the corresponding tax increase. Therefore, a rise in zu tends to increase participation
even if the government budget is balanced. A positive benefit paid to individuals outside the labor force,
as defined in Eq. (22), counterbalances this effect.
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this case. Although optimal labor market tightness can still be obtained by choosing
zwi = zu, the participation decision will necessarily be distorted if benefits paid to
the unemployed and to the inactive cannot be differentiated.
4.2 Social welfare
The conditions derived in the preceding section describe the optimal policy from the
point of view of an utilitarian SWF but the use of inequality-averse SWF would lead
to different optimal policies. In particular, decreasing marginal tax rates would not
be found optimal with a strongly inequality-averse SWF. Our focus differs from the
optimal taxation perspective: we use these optimal efficiency results only as a guide
to identify potential reform policies that would improve social welfare for an entire
class of SWF.
Nevertheless, the set of efficient policies identified above can help us to choose
potential reform policies that would be socially desirable when the initial situation
is characterized by an unemployment insurance scheme with a constant marginal tax
rate. From the point of view of economic efficiency, it seems reasonable to introduce
in-work benefits in order to get closer to optimal labor market tightness (zwi = zu).
As in-work benefits are identical for all skill levels at the optimum, we assume that
they move in parallel (zwi = zw) even if they are below this optimal level. As to
the structure of tax rates, different SWFs will find decreasing or increasing marginal
tax rates optimal. Therefore, we assume for simplicity that the marginal tax rate is
constant (τi = τ ). Finally, we assume in all simulations that the Hosios condition is
satisfied.
In this section, we explore numerically the consequences of various reform poli-
cies on SWFs displaying different degrees of inequality aversion, ranging from the
utilitarian to the Rawlsian case. Because of the convenient parameterization of in-
equality aversion, we choose the additive specification of the SWF proposed by
Atkinson (1970). According to this specification, “equally distributed equivalent util-
ity” Y e is defined as
Y e =
(
sJ Y
1−
J + (1 − sJ )
∑
i,j
f 0ij Y
1−
ij
)1/(1−)
, (25)
where YJ is the utility of an entrepreneur, i is the skill category, j the employment
state (employment, unemployment, leisure), f 0ij the share of workers of skill i in
state j and Yij the per-capita utility of those workers. For the sake of completeness,
entrepreneurs are included in the welfare criterion. We assume that they represent a
fixed share, sJ , of population.21 The parameter  captures the degree of inequality
aversion. For  = 0, Y e measures economic efficiency and is equal to the utilitarian
aggregate welfare criterion, Ψ . With  → ∞, Y e tends toward the Rawlsian criterion
where only the welfare of the poorest individual is taken into account.
21The population share sJ is calibrated in such a way that the entrepreneur’s initial utility level is twice the
utility level of the average worker. The contribution of individuals outside the labor force to social welfare
is not straightforward to compute because of their heterogeneity (an appendix describing the approximation
procedure is available on request).
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Table 3 Model versions and utility levels of least well-off individuals
Possiblity of monitoring
Model acronym
Least well-off individual
(Utility)
Perfect
monitoringa
(zu = zn = 0)
Monitoring
impossibleb
(zu = zn)
Type of heterogeneity
L-heterogeneity L-PM
Low-skill unemployed
(U4)
L-MI
Low-skill unemployed
(U4)
D-heterogeneity D-PM
Inactive individuals
(ν/r)
D-MI
Inactive individuals
((ν + zu)/r)
aTransfers to the inactive are set to 0 whereas unemployment benefits vary in simulations (along the y-axis
in Figs. 2 and 3)
bTransfers to the inactive are identical to unemployment benefits. Both vary together in simulations (along
the y-axis in Figs. 4 and 5)
In our analysis of reform policies, we take account of the problem of imperfect
monitoring of job search effort and of the government’s uncertainty about the type
of heterogeneity that governs participation behavior. We do this by considering four
different model versions that are distinguished along two dimensions (see Table 3).
On the one hand, heterogeneity is modeled either as varying preference for leisure
(L-heterogeneity) or as different degrees of disability of work (D-heterogeneity). On
the other hand, we assume that job search monitoring is either perfect (PM) or impos-
sible (MI). In Table 3, we show the acronyms of the four model versions and indicate
the identity and utility level of the least well-off individual. The latter is determinant
for the Rawlsian case of the SWF and will help us to interpret the simulation results
for  = ∞.
For the reasons outlined above, our preferred reform candidate is the introduc-
tion of in-work benefits, keeping the unemployment benefit at its initial level. The
marginal tax rate is determined by the balanced budget constraint of the government.
In the context of our calibrated model, this reform will turn out to be the only one that
is able to increase (or to not decrease) social welfare for all SWFs in the class that we
consider, and for all model versions that we consider. In a first step, we explore this
question by depicting social indifference curves in the space (zw, zu) for different de-
grees of inequality-aversion and for all four versions of the model (see Figs. 2 to 5).
Note that zn varies together with zu in model versions where job search monitoring is
impossible (MI); it is set to zero if monitoring is perfect (PM). The initial situation of
the economy is indicated by a black square and the direction of our preferred reform
policy is depicted by an arrow.
Some intuition can be gained by considering first a simplified model with ex-
ogenous participation. In this case, the tax system cannot distort the participation
decision (by assumption) and condition (21) alone determines maximum economic
efficiency. Panel (a) of Fig. 1 depicts indifference curves of a utilitarian SWF that is
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Fig. 1 Social welfare contours as a function of zw and zu, for different values of inequality aversion:
model version L-PM with exogenous labor supply
insensitive to inequality ( = 0).22 The “ridge” of the SWF along the diagonal con-
firms that maximum efficiency is reached when zu = zw , regardless of the level of
benefits. A government whose SWF exhibits inequality aversion ( > 0) will prefer
to choose higher benefit levels (as long as they are identical) since higher benefit
levels imply a higher marginal tax rate and therefore a more progressive tax system.
This is clearly illustrated by the other panels of Fig. 1, which show that social wel-
fare increases in the direction of the upper right corner. Therefore, the optimal policy
(which second-order dominates all other policies) consists in letting the marginal tax
rate τ/(1 + τ) go to 1. In that case, utilities of all individuals are equalized, even be-
tween the employed and the unemployed (Wi − Ui tends to 0, see footnote 11). This
result shows that it is crucial to take the participation decision into account in order
to get meaningful results.
Now turn to the model with endogenous participation. Social indifference curves
of the four model versions are depicted in Figs. 2–5. Consider first the results with
respect to economic efficiency (utilitarian SWF, shown in panel (a) of Figs. 2–5).
22These social indifference curves were calculated using version L-PM of the model. Results with version
L-MI are identical for the SWF with  = 0 and are available on request.
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Fig. 2 Social welfare contours as a function of zw and zu, for different values of inequality aversion:
model version L-PM
In all model versions, maximum efficiency is attained for zu = zw = 0. For model
versions L-PM and D-PM (Figs. 2 and 3), this might seem surprising in the light of
the theoretical result obtained above for the model with perfect job search monitoring.
The main reason for this outcome is obviously the fact that we impose a unique
marginal tax rate instead of the optimal structure that is decreasing with skill. The
efficiency cost of redistribution seems to be rather low, however, since the level of
social welfare decreases very slowly when traveling from the origin toward the upper
right corner, along the diagonal where zu = zw . This is confirmed by the fact that
the optimal zu and zw grow very rapidly when one considers SWFs with increasing
inequality aversion (see panels (b) to (d) of Figs. 2 and 3). For  = 0.1, optimal
social welfare is attained for approximately zu = zw = 0.3, corresponding to τ = 0.42
(equivalent to a marginal tax rate of 0.29 levied on pretax income). For  = 0.5,
the optimal zw obviously exceeds 0.4, but the condition zu = zw should still hold
approximately at the social welfare optimum.
To understand the results for the Rawlsian SWF (panel (d)), it is important to see
that the degree of redistribution increases much more when moving from left to right
(by increasing zw) than by moving from the bottom to the top (by increasing zu).
The reason is that an increase of in-work benefits concerns a large majority of the
population and increases marginal tax rates much more than an increase in the un-
Social welfare effects of tax-benefit reform 219
Fig. 3 Social welfare contours as a function of zw and zu, for different values of inequality aversion:
model version D-PM
employment benefit (marginal tax rates are close to 44 % at the lower right corner of
Figs. 2 and 3, but only equal to 1.5 % at the upper left corner). The Rawlsian SWF
prefers a more progressive tax system as can be obtained by increasing zw .
For the model versions where search monitoring is impossible (L-MI and D-MI,
Figs. 4 and 5), the efficiency cost of increasing the unemployment benefit (and si-
multaneously the transfer to the inactive since zn = zu) is higher due to the fact that
the higher average tax rates, required to finance the transfers to the inactive, distort
the participation decision to a greater degree. With an inequality-averse SWF, the re-
sults depend greatly on the type of preference heterogeneity that is assumed. With
L-heterogeneity (Fig. 4), the least well-off individual is a low-skilled unemployed.
Somehow paradoxically, he benefits much more from the introduction of an in-work
benefit (the expected time to find a job is 3 months) than from the increase in un-
employment benefits, which are also paid to the inactive (and which he contributes
to finance by his taxes). Therefore, in model version L-MI, the Rawlsian SWF fa-
vors a high degree of redistribution, but only among the labor force by increasing
simultaneously zw and the marginal tax rate.
If preference heterogeneity is interpreted as capturing different degrees of work
disability (D-heterogeneity, Fig. 5), the inactive are the least well-off individuals in
the economy. Therefore, their utility level will count more in the SWF if the govern-
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Fig. 4 Social welfare contours as a function of zw and zu, for different values of inequality aversion:
model version L-MI
ment is inequality-averse and transfers to individuals without a job are more highly
valued than in the L-heterogeneity case. For the Rawlsian SWF, the result is straight-
forward: only an increase in zu improves the well-being of the least well-off since
their intertemporal utility is given by (ν + zu)/r . This result is the reason why re-
form policies that start from the initial situation depicted by a black square must
not decrease unemployment benefits since this would unambiguously decrease social
welfare according to the Rawlsian SWF.
It is interesting to note that the type of preference heterogeneity matters only if
search behavior cannot be monitored. In the opposite case, the two model versions
L-PM and D-PM yield almost identical results (Figs. 2 and 3). This result shows that
the assumptions about heterogeneity matter when the individuals outside the labor
force are concerned by transfer policies.
To sum up, all our model versions and SWF variants arrive at the conclusion that
the introduction of in-work benefits seems a promising reform candidate. Moreover,
in the limits of our exercise where marginal tax rates are constant, it seems to be
the only reform candidate. Indeed, starting from the initial situation (depicted by the
black square), the only direction in which social welfare increases in all panels of
Figs. 2–5 is to the right (as indicated by the arrow).
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Fig. 5 Social welfare contours as a function of zw and zu, for different values of inequality aversion:
model version D-MI
4.3 Generalized Lorenz dominance
Having identified the introduction of in-work benefits as a promising candidate for
reform, we proceed in this section to a more formal check whether such a measure
would satisfy not only necessary, but also sufficient conditions for being socially
desirable. We will also explore whether any level of in-work benefits (up to the level
of unemployment assistance) would fulfill the requirements of a socially desirable
reform.
The ordinal approach can be made operational by applying Shorrocks’ (1983) The-
orem 2. This theorem states that a reform would increase social welfare according to
any SWF satisfying the criteria of Pareto, anonymity, and the principle of transfers if
and only if the post-reform Generalized Lorenz (GL) curve dominates the pre-reform
GL-curve.23 The criterion of GL-dominance ensures therefore that the desirability of
a reform would be judged in an unanimous way by observers whose ethical prefer-
ences can be described by any SWF satisfying the three criteria given above.
23Generalized Lorenz dominance is equivalent to second-order stochastic dominance (Thistle 1989). See
also Sen (1997, p. 132–138).
222 B. van Baalen, T. Müller
The preceding discussion suggests that an increase in zw would be a promising
reform candidate, with zu remaining unchanged. With linear taxation and a balanced
government budget, such a reform increases the progressivity of the tax system and
implies more redistribution. From the point of view of economic efficiency, there
are two counterbalancing effects: labor market tightness evolves toward greater effi-
ciency, but more redistribution among skill categories biases participation decisions
in an inefficient manner (the participation rate increases for the low-skilled, and de-
creases for the high-skilled). The simulations described above suggest that in the
Swiss case, the former effect dominates the latter.
In order to check formally for social welfare dominance, we compare general-
ized Lorenz curves of the pre- and post-reform situations. Recall that the generalized
Lorenz curve (Shorrocks 1983) can be obtained from the ordinary Lorenz curve by
multiplying cumulated income shares (measured on the y-axis) by mean income. Our
two necessary conditions for a reform to improve social welfare have simple inter-
pretations in the context of the GL curves. First, the vertical distance between the two
curves at the far right indicates the difference between mean incomes in the post- and
pre-reform situations. Second, the difference between slopes at the origin of the two
GL curves indicates whether the group of individuals with the lowest utility level fare
better after the reform. Therefore, the necessary conditions for SW (or GL) domi-
nance are that the post-reform GL curve starts out with a greater (or identical) slope
than the pre-reform curve and that it arrives at a higher (or identical) level at the right
end.
To make small differences more visible, Fig. 6 shows the vertical distance between
two post-reform GL curves (partial reform with zw = 0.1; full reform with zw = zu)
and the pre-reform GL curve (base case with zu = 0.4 and zw = 0) for all four model
versions. In all cases, the reform produces an efficiency gain since the difference
between post- and pre-reform GL curves ends up at a positive level. The efficiency
gain is greater in the model versions where job search monitoring is impossible (L-MI
and D-MI).
In the model version L-PM, the partial reform dominates the pre-reform situation,
whereas this is not the case for the full reform (the GL curves intersect twice above
the 90th percentile). How can this result be explained? As indicated above, the par-
allel increase of zw and τ increases the progressivity of the tax system and leads
to redistribution from high-skill workers to low-skill workers. The adverse distribu-
tional effects seem to become important with the full reform and high-skill workers
lose more than low-skill workers gain. Only the gains of entrepreneurs ensure that the
sum of individual utilities increases with the full reform. It should be noted that this
result depends on our assumptions on firm ownership (entrepreneurs form a separate
population group and are initially “richer” than workers) and on tax structure (firm
profits are not taxed). Alternative assumptions might lead to the conclusion that even
the full reform dominates the initial situation according to the GL criterion.
One can therefore conclude from the preceding discussion that the introduction of
in-work benefits (with zw lower than zu) is a socially desirable reform in the sense
that it is preferred to the current situation in Switzerland by any observer using a
social welfare criterion embodying some degree of inequality aversion.
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Fig. 6 Generalized Lorenz dominance: impact of in-work benefits in different model versions
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we search for socially desirable tax-benefit reforms by adopting an
ordinal approach to social welfare comparisons: a post-reform situation is preferred
to the current situation if social welfare is improved according to an entire class of
social welfare functions. This approach enables us to identify reforms that could be
agreed upon by observers with different value judgments as long as these satisfy some
widely accepted criteria.
We use a model with endogenous labor supply and unemployment where more
redistribution does not necessarily come at the expense of economic efficiency. Start-
ing from the current (nonoptimal) situation, there is scope for enhancing efficiency
without increasing inequality and worsening the situation of the least well-off. Using
a calibrated model for Switzerland, we show that the introduction of in-work benefits
would be a socially desirable reform in the sense that it would be unanimously pre-
ferred to the current situation according to all social welfare functions based on the
criteria of Pareto, anonymity, and the principle of transfers.
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It should be emphasized that this unanimity is obtained for four versions of the
model, accounting for the possibility that job search effort cannot be monitored and
that preference heterogeneity can take two different forms. This result is all the more
remarkable as the two types of preference heterogeneity and the two polar cases of
search monitoring lead to quite different shapes of the social welfare function.
The analysis of these reform policies could be refined in future work by extending
our framework in two directions. First, the choice of work hours could be endoge-
nized in the model. In a labor supply setting without search frictions, Saez (2002)
shows that the optimal tax schedule is closer to a negative income tax if labor market
responses are concentrated along the intensive (hours) margin. It remains to be seen
whether these results carries over to a model with involuntary unemployment.
Second, the existence of a segmented labor market might change the conclusions
with respect to socially desirable reforms. Acemoglu (2001) uses a search-matching
model where “good” and “bad” jobs are created in equilibrium because of different
(sunk) capital costs. He shows that the composition of jobs is inefficiently biased
toward low-wage jobs because of hold-up problems. In this context, the reduction in
the average tax rates for low incomes implied by in-work benefits is likely to shift the
composition of low-skill employment even further toward the “bad jobs,” leading to
an efficiency loss. The exact implications for the design of tax-benefit reforms is left
for future research.
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Appendix A: Economic efficiency: optimality conditions
According to the utilitarian criterion, aggregate welfare Ψ (at time t = 0) is defined
as the sum of individual utilities:
Ψ =
∑
i
si
[
(1 − πi)N¯i +
(
πi − i(0)
)
Ui + i(0)(Wi + Ji)
]
, (A.1)
where πi = H(ξi), i(0) is the initial employment rate and N¯i =
∫ ∞
ξi
xH ′(x)dx/
(1 − πi) + zn is average utility of inactive individuals. It can be shown that (A.1) is
equal to
Ψ =
∑
i
si
∫ ∞
0
{∫ ∞
ξi
xH ′(x)dx + i(t)pi −
(
πi − i(t)
)
picθi
}
e−rt dt, (A.2)
where i(t) evolves according to (1). The initial employment rates i(0) are fixed and
the problem of efficiency maximization consists in maximizing Ψ subject to
˙i (t) = θim(θi)πi −
[
q + θim(θi)
]
i(t), πi = H(ξi), i(0) = 0i . (A.3)
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Consider first the optimal level of labor market tightness, denoted by θˆi . According
to the necessary conditions of the maximum principle, θˆi is the solution of24[
r + q + θim(θi)
]
c/(1 + θic) = m(θi)
[
1 − η(θi)
]
, (A.4)
where η(θi) = |θim′(θi)/m(θi)| is the absolute value of the elasticity of m(θi).
What policies can the government use to attain maximum efficiency? In the de-
centralized equilibrium, θi is determined by Eq. (16). Combining this equation with
the optimality condition (A.4) and using (9) yields Eq. (21) in the main text.25
Now turn to the optimal choice of labor market participation, denoted by πˆi =
H(ξˆi). The optimal reservation level of the leisure parameter is given by ξˆi = gi(θˆi),
where gi is derived from the following first-order condition, obtained by maximizing
the Hamiltonian with respect to ξi :
ξi = m(θi) − (r + q)c
r + q + θim(θi) piθi ≡ gi(θi). (A.5)
What policies are compatible with optimal participation rates? Combining (A.5) with
the job creation condition (15) yields
ξi = θim(θi)
r + q + θim(θi) wi(1 + τ). (A.6)
Comparison of (A.6) with the determination of ξi in the decentralized equilibrium
(11) leads to the following condition:
τwi = zw − zn + r + q
θim(θi)
(zu − zn). (A.7)
Equation (A.7) leads to the conclusion that a laissez-faire policy without government
intervention ensures maximum efficiency with respect to the participation decision.
As there are no externalities involved, this does not come as a surprise. A more in-
teresting question is whether there exist other policies that can ensure an efficient
outcome. To address this question more clearly, the government’s budget constraint
has to be taken into account. Substituting (A.7) into the intertemporal budget con-
straint (14) yields condition (22) in the main text.
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